The economic impact of an institutional transplant depends on the underlying cultural environment of the receiving country. This paper provides the first evidence that culture interacts with institutions mediating their effect on economic outcomes. Specifically, good institutions, when transplanted, have a positive economic effect only in those territories characterized by cultural similarity with the exporting country. We obtain this result using county-level data from late nineteenthcentury Prussia. This environment allows us to exploit both the quasi-natural experiment generated by the radical Napoleonic institutional reforms, and the deeply rooted cultural heterogeneity across Prussian counties. First, exploiting religious affiliation as an inverse proxy of cultural commonality, we find no effect of French institutions in Protestant areas. Then, using hand-collected data on pre-Napoleonic kingdoms we show that, even when controlling for institutional proximity, kingdoms previously exposed to French culture exhibit a more effective transplant in terms of long-run economic performance. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that cultural compatibility between the country exporting the institution and the receiving areas is a significant determinant of a successful transplant.
Introduction
Economists have long argued the importance of good institutions for economic growth. Rule of law, better enforcement of contracts, security of property rights are usually associated with better economic outcomes, such as higher investment in physical and human capital, and technological progress. Some countries lacking good legal institutions have attempted to import them from abroad with the goal of boosting economic growth (e.g. Chinese antitrust law, Japanese national Civil Code). However, the adoption of good foreign institutions not always led to positive economic outcomes (e.g. in British African colonies).
Why does institutional transplant fail? Is culture responsible for it? When institutions are perceived as "foreign" or "in conflict" with local culture and social norms they may not be assimilated and, thus, not fully enforced. If this is the case, the effectiveness of a transplanted formal institution will crucially hinge on the reception by local communities and elites. This paper focuses on the differential long-term economic effect of an institutional transplant. Specifically, we argue that the growth effect of transferring a well functioning institution from its original setting depends on the cultural compatibility with the receiving country.
In order to test our hypothesis we focus on a particular historical natural experiment: the Napoleonic invasion of German territories and the consequent imposition of French institutions. Our novel finding is that the transplant of the Napoleonic Code, a good legal institution, had heterogeneous effects on economic performance across German areas characterized by different cultural traits. In particular, the transplant was more effective in areas with stronger cultural commonality with France. The imposition of the Napoleonic Code increases our measure of economic performance by 12-20% in areas culturally similar to France while it has virtually no effect in culturally distant ones.
A potential mechanism through which culture affects the adoption of the new formal institutions is local enforcement. 1 In his quest to build a pan-European empire, Napoleon sought to assimilate the conquered territories and to forge a class of loyal new Frenchmen to support him in the administration of the Empire. Historical evidence shows how, in some areas, local elites willingly fit themselves into the Napoleonic society because they shared the same values, and this facilitated the implementation of new institutions (it is the case of Piedmont and Rhineland). In other areas, instead, the amalgamation policy pursued by Napoleon imposed French culture on a reluctant population and the Napoleonic Code was simply too alien to be enforced by local communities. 2 In our empirical analysis we construct several measures to capture different dimensions of cultural distance with the French invader. Our first proxy of similarity is the Protestant share of the population. Given that France was predominantly Catholic at that time, this measure serves as an inverse proxy for cultural similarity. Religious af-filiation has several advantages: it is available for all 447 Prussian counties, it is well measured and varies substantially across different areas. The Protestant share, however, might not summarize all aspects of cultural commonality that may be relevant for an institutional transplant, hence we also construct alternative proxies based on hand-collected data. These measures are intended to capture cultural linkages and the exposure to French Culture before the French revolution, namely: (i) presence of Huguenots colonies, (ii) diffusion of books in French, (iii) kinship between each German ruler and French aristocracy, and (iv) attitudes of each ruler both towards the French Enlightenment ideals and French customs.
We perform several robustness checks to ensure that our results are not spuriously driven by observable and unobservable characteristics of Prussian counties. First, we map Prussian counties to pre-Napoleonic states. This allows us to condition the estimation on a full set of kingdom fixed effects, thereby controlling for any difference in pre-existing social norms, historical facts and economic characteristics. Second, we explore a wide range of alternative specifications using a large set of controls and several proxies for economic performance and institutions. Third, we show that our findings are not contaminated by past implementation of liberal reforms in some Prussian areas. Finally, we explore a number of competing explanations such as: (i) human capital accumulation, (ii) religious fractionalization within county and (iii) religious diversity with neighboring counties. We find none of these to fully explain our results.
Our paper contributes to an emerging literature on the interplay between culture and institutions. While the individual role of culture and institutions on economic outcomes has been widely investigated (see ? for an updated and comprehensive review of the literature), studies on the interaction between these two drivers are still scant. ? develop a model of culture, institution and their joint dynamics. 3 Interestingly, they characterize situations where institutions and culture can act as complements, augmenting their effect on economic performance, or as substitutes, when the cultural traits do not support the institutions. We are the first to address a similar question from an empirical perspective. Interpreting our results in terms of their framework, cultural commonality generates complementarities between local culture and the transplanted institutions enhancing economic performance. In a seminal paper, ? model the interaction between law enforcement and social norms. An interesting prediction of their model is that laws in conflict with prevailing social norms may backfire as they do not spur the private cooperation needed for an effective enforcement. 4 Reading our results through the lens of their model, an institutional transplant may fail due to the lack of private cooperation in the receiving countries, resulting in heterogeneous long-run economic effects.
We also connect to three strands of research. First we relate to the literature on transplant of legal systems (??). While these studies mainly focus on the effectiveness of imported legal institutions and attribute differences in their adoption to the process of lawmaking and to the demand for law, we test the channel of cultural similarity as a mediating factor in the reception of transplanted institution and analyze the long term economic effect of the interplay between new legal institutions and the local culture.
The second important stream of literature we connect to is the one investigating the importance of good institutions for economic growth. Starting with the seminal work of Douglass North, many scholars have emphasized that institutions "matter". 5 In an influential paper, ? exploited the variation in institutional reforms during Napoleonic campaigns across eighteenth and nineteenth-century to show that these radical reforms had a positive and significant effects on long-term economic performance. 6 In contrast to the existing contributions, our analysis does not focus on the positive effect of adopting a good institution but on the heterogeneity of its reception due to the underlying cultural traits and on the resulting differences in economic effects. Finally, we touch upon the rich literature analyzing the link between culture and economic performance. 7 In particular, related to our paper are the works by ? and ?. They both test the Weberian hypothesis 8 using data on early modern Germanythe same historical environment that we exploit -but provide controversial results. ? analyzes the impact of Protestantism on urbanization using city-level data from the seventeenth-century. He finds no significant effect of Protestant ethic on economic development. ? use an argument similar to the one proposed by ?? stressing the importance of human capital to explain economic prosperity. Using cross-county variation in Prussia during the nineteenth-century, they find evidence of higher level of human capital in Protestant areas, thus providing an alternative channel to explain the higher prosperity of Protestant regions. We provide the first empirical evidence of the mediating effect of culture in a law transplant, thereby marrying the literatures on culture and that on institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the historical background, discussing the political situation of German territories before French invasion, French military campaigns, and the introduction of the Civil Code. Section 3 describes our data and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our main results and discusses their robustness. Section 5 explores some alternative potential explanations for our findings. Section 6 investigates the effects of the other cultural measures, different from religious affiliation, that affect the reception of the Napoleonic code. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Historical Overview

The Holy Roman Empire before 1800
The territories of the Holy Roman Empire had always been characterized by a considerable degree of heterogeneity. Since its foundation in 962 AD the Holy Roman Empire was a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual ensemble of several entities -eventually hundreds -governed by kings, dukes, counts and bishops, collectively known as princes. These different layers of political power became gradually more autonomous as the Holy Roman emperors shifted their attention to their local kingdoms. Pivotal in the progressive disintegration of the Empire was Protestant Reformation. Starting as a protest against the corruption of the Roman Catholic Church, the Reformation quickly spread out throughout central Germany gaining the support of several princes who wanted to stress their political and religious independence. In 1555, after several years of war, the Emperor and the Protestant German princes signed a peace treaty in Augsburg. The principle of cuius regio eius religio ("whose realm, his religion") was affirmed making Lutheranism an official religion of the Empire. The ambition of the emperor to centralize power and rule over a unified empire was thus permanently shattered. Religious and political wars continued to afflict the Holy Roman Empire until a stable resolution was reached with the Peace of Westphalia. By 1648 the Empire was just a confederation of German princes who, in their own lands, had the right to legislate, impose taxes, organize an army, mint and engage in foreign policy.
The political fragmentation of the Empire (see Figure ?? ) gave rise to persistent institutional and cultural heterogeneity. This diversity was also reinforced by the internal migration of religious minorities, most notably Jews and French Protestants, which imported their own values and customs. All these elements contribute to create an extremely variegated picture where each territory displays its own identity. Religious affiliation, albeit just facet, is the first evident aspect of these cultural differences.
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Military Campaigns
The emergence of revolutionary France as an aggressive and strong military power at the end of the eighteenth-century marked the end of the Holy Roman Empire. The first crushing victories by the French army created a power vacuum in the German territories which Napoleon exploited to create a "cordon sanitaire" between France and its traditional Eastern enemies, Austria and Russia. By 1795 Napoleon was in control of the left bank of the Rhine which was formally annexed to the French Empire with the treaty of Luneville (1801). 9 When the Habsburg ceded part of their German estates to Napoleon's allies, in 1805, the end of the Holy Roman Empire was essentially determined. The following year, central Germany was unified in the Confederation of the Rhine, a formally independent confederation of sixteen states whose protector and unofficial ruler was Napoleon. 10 French expansion continued until Napoleon's downfall after the Russian campaign in 1812. By that time French sphere of influence extended to Poland (with the creation of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807) and to Northern Germany (with the annexation of the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Lubeck, and Bremen in 1810). By the first decade of nineteenth-century Napoleon had taken over the majority of German states. Figure ? ? shows the counties in territories controlled by Napoleon differentiating between annexed areas and satellite states.
In his expansion of the French Empire, Napoleon was mainly driven by ideological and geo-political concerns, rather than by the economic outlook of the region. Besides 9 According to ?, this treaty has also been called the "First Revolution of Germany" given that a "territory of 150,000 square miles, peopled by 3,500,000 inhabitants, and amounting to about a seventh part of the population and territory of the whole Empire" was transferred to the French Empire. 10 The members of the Confederation promised to "supply their protector with a military contingent" (?) and, in return for their support, they were given higher statuses or additional territories. For example the free cities of Augsburg and Nuremberg were annexed by Bavaria and Frankfurt to Dalberg, Nassau became a duchy and Dalberg became the prince primate of the Confederation of the Rhine. the security concern of having influence over a buffer region that separated France from the two main Eastern powers, the Revolutionary rhetoric of France natural borders was driving his military campaigns. 11 Therefore, following Acemoglu et al. (2010), we can consider Napoleonic invasions as a quasi-natural shock in our empirical analysis.
The Imposition of the French Institutions
Despite the marked institutional heterogeneity of the Holy Roman Empire resulting from the high territorial fragmentation, some useful general features can be identified. At the dawn of nineteenth-century the institutions of the ancien regime still pervaded the German territories and feudal privileges were the norm. In rural areas, even where serfdom had been abolished, peasants were subject to several restrictions and burdened by a list of duties and services they had to provide to their lords. In the cities, guilds regulated the access to different trades, often limiting the development and the growth of the industry they controlled. 12 Equality before the law was still far from being contemplated: aristocrats, clergy, military benefited from particular exemptions, while other groups were discriminated (e.g. Jews).
The arrival of Napoleon was a disruptive force. His rule over central Europe meant the imposition of a series of institutional reforms. The most important was arguably the introduction of the Civil Code. Emblem of the values promoted during the French Revolution, the Code Napoleon (1804) introduced equality before the law to all men regardless of their social and economic status. Moreover, it consecrated absolute property rights to which the code dedicated a total of 1776 articles. 13 Finally, the Code provided a modern legal framework that regulated all aspects of social interaction, from family matters to economic contracts. However the drafting of the code was not only driven by revolutionary ideals but also by the more conservative values. According to ? on several points of the code "the legislative reforms of the Revolution were diluted or abandoned"(pag.49). Several other sources stress the bond between some parts of the code (ex.the articles regulating family) and French traditional values. 14 The process of codification continued with the promulgation of the Code of Civil Procedure (1806), the Commercial Code (1807), the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure 11 Discussion on the Rhine question began well before the outbreak of the hostilities in 1792. The idea of French natural borders became prominent among the jacobian revolutionaries. Georges Jacques Danton on January 21, 1793 during the national convention was arguing in favor of the annexation of Belgium saying that "the limits of France are marked by nature, we will reach reach the four corners of the horizon, to the edge of the Rhine, to the edge of the ocean, to the edge of the Pyrenees, to the edge of the Alps. The boundaries of our Republic must be there". For more details see ?. 12 In the Rhenish area, for example, guilds were imposing strict limitations on the adoption of new technologies (?). 13 A huge amount when compared to 515, the number of articles regulating person. See ?. 14 ? observes that "[the Civil Code] was not a new set of laws. The family code was based on traditional ideals and customs dominant in France since the thirteenth century". ? argues that "The substantial elements [of the Civil Code] are drawn from the Civil Law, Feudal Customs, Canon Law, Royal Ordinances, and Laws of the Revolutionary Assemblies, which predominate in the order named, showing how firmly tradition held the French people despite the annihilating processes of the Revolution" (pag. 142). Finally ? outlines the profiles of the four members of the Commission to draft the Code and he writes that "Of the four who were selected everyone was past middle age and a conservative, at heart attached to the old regime, and Napoleon knew it" (pag 117).
(1808) and the Penal Code (1810). All these codes were imposed on the satellites states under Napoleon's control. Interestingly, some states decided to retain the codes even after Napoleon's fall, and even in those ones that formally abandon the Code Napoleon, the institutions were permanently affected. 15 Beyond the judicial innovations, French rule also implied a more efficient model of administration and the implementation of fiscal reforms that introduced budgeting and rationalization of public expenditures.
The introduction of judicial and bureaucratic reforms occasionally generated hostility among the indigenous population: the new norms were often perceived as extraneous and incompatible with local culture and customs. 16 Historical evidence shows that in some areas the code met the opposition not only of the aristocracy, deprived of its privileges, but even of the very social classes the revolution meant to emancipate. This suggests that the transition from the ancien regime to the modern era evolved at different speeds across territories and, in some states, the transplant of French institutions failed.
Data and Variables
We build a novel dataset containing cross-sectional information on 447 Prussian counties immediately after the German unification (1871). 17 We combine census data from the Ifo Prussian Economic History Database (iPEHD) with pre-Napoleonic information compiled using historical sources. In particular, we map all the counties into 48 eighteenth-century states: this allows us to build pre-Napoleonic variables at kingdom level based on historical rulers, their relations with France and the implementation of liberal reforms. 18 We complement the resulting dataset with information on the historical religious affiliation by ? and ?.
Following an established strand of literature (???), we use wages to proxy for economic performance. Our main measure of county-level income is the average annual wage of male elementary school teachers from the 1886 Education Census. This is the 15 In the Rhineland territories annexed to Prussia after the Congress of Vienna, a commission was set up to decide whether to extend Prussian law or keep the French one. The Commission ended its work in 1818 and recommended the preservation of the French judicial system. French law remained in force in Rhineland until 1900. But also local population and business community were at the forefront to retain the code. See ? and ? for more details. Another notable example is the Duchy of Baden that decided to retain the Napoleonic code even after 1815. 16 ? p. 130, documents the existence of distrust and animosities between Rhinelanders and "émigrés and the corrupt hangers-on who had entered the region with the revolutionary army". Also the French recognized the complexity of exporting a new system, as ? notes, "They recognised that acceptance of their procedures and values required trust and collaboration on the part of those they regarded as men of influence in society. They acknowledged that the imposition of so comprehensive a new set of rules would inevitably clash with many established practices, which had emerged from and expressed often long-accepted values"(pag. 185). 17 We choose this period because it guarantees the widest geographical coverage (including information on the former members of the Confederation of the Rhine) and also a sufficient time lag for the new institutions to affect economic performance. Moreover the difference between our sample and ?, they have 452 observations in their main specifications, is due to those counties we could not map into prenapoleonic kingdoms. Our results are not affected if we include those observations in the specifications with no pre-napoleonic controls. 18 The list of the kingdoms is in the Data Appendix. earliest direct measure of income available for all counties. Teacher's salary, albeit representative of a simple occupational group, reflects the development of the county as its main determinants were local contributions. 19 One drawback of this proxy is that it may be influenced both by the value the local community attaches to education and by other benefits provided to the teachers (e.g. free housing). In our empirical analysis we address these issues controlling for factors that affect both the demand for teachers (e.g. number of pupils, demographic structure, etc) and the supply of teachers (free housing, total number of teachers). Exploiting later waves of the Prussian Census, we assess the robustness of our results using the wage of (unskilled) day laborers in 1892 and other two income proxies first proposed by Becker and Woessmann (2009): income tax revenue per capita and the size of the non agricultural sector.
Our main measure of institutional transplant is a binary variable, which takes value 1 if the county is either in the provinces annexed to the French Empire (e.g. Rhineland) or in a satellite state (e.g. Kingdom of Westphalia). This variable reflects the presence of French Institutions since, in our sample, all the territories under direct or indirect control of Napoleon were imposed the Civil Code and, at least partially, the set of modernizing reforms. Employing a dummy variable is the simplest way to account for the introduction of the Napoleonic institutions. Admittedly, the exposure to the new institutions was not homogeneous across kingdoms as it varied according to the fortune of the military campaigns. Therefore, in some specifications, we employ alternative proxies of institutions that take into account the different intensity of French presence. Specifically, in the robustness checks, we first differentiate territories annexed to the French Empire, which faithfully imported all French institutions, from satellite kingdoms. We then use years of French presence, which ranges from 5 to 20 years, as a proxy of intensity of the transplant. Consistently with the existing literature, we expect the average effect of the transplant of good institutions on economic performance to be positive.
Cultural traits are notably difficult to measure. We use religious affiliation as our favorite proxy of cultural diversity. Besides being easily measurable, religious beliefs are suitable to capture cultural commonality, in particular "[we] expect that two countries with the same religion tend to have similar cultures" (?). Moreover, as already mentioned above, religion has been of paramount importance in shaping the politics of the Holy Roman Empire, determining alliances, wars and lineages. Hence, we expect religious affiliation to synthesize various cultural aspects beyond the mere spiritual dimension and to play a fundamental role in the transplant of French institutions. In particular, we expect Protestant territories to be less receptive to the new institutions which embedded centuries of French Catholic culture. The persistence of religious affiliation across centuries has been well documented (Cantoni 2012). We then use the share of Protestants in the county from the 1871 Census as an inverse measure of cultural similarity before the Napoleonic invasion. Figure ?? shows the geographical distribution of this measure, Protestant are mainly concentrated in the central part of modern Germany. To test the robustness of the results we construct a dummy variable containing information on the religious affiliation at the beginning of the seventeenth-century taken from ? and ?.
A possible concern is that religious affiliation does not capture all the relevant cul-tural aspects that contribute to a successful institutional transplant. We thus construct two measures that synthesize two different aspects of cultural similarity with France: French Exposure and Pro-French Ruler. The former variable is meant to capture the exposure of local population to French culture. We expect that early contact with French traditions and customs should facilitate the assimilation of French institutions. First, we consider the circulation of books in French language after the diffusion of the printing press in sixteenth-century. 20 We collect data from the Universal Short Title Catalogue, a comprehensive database of all books published in Europe between the introduction of the printing press and the end of the sixteenth-century. The underlying idea is that the diffusion of manuscripts in French should be associated with the presence of French natives or, at least, French-speaking population. Second, we investigate whether the kingdoms received Huguenots migrants during the seventeenth-century, exploiting county level data using ?. 21 Many Huguenots left France after Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685 and the majority of them migrated to the Protestant neighboring countries. Some sovereigns even competed to attract these skilled French immigrants offering them special privileges: a prominent example is the Electorate of Brandenburg which, with the Edict of Potsdam, granted the Huguenots a tax-free status for ten years and allowed them to hold church services in their native language. Often, these French migrants built their own communities in the towns in which they settled preserving their own traditions and identity. We construct a dummy variable, French Exposure, that equals one either if a book in French language was printed in that county, or if the kingdom registered the presence of Huguenots' colonies. We expect the transplant to be more effective if local population had previous exposure to French culture.
The second variable we construct, Pro-French Ruler, captures the existence of a positive attitude of the eighteenth-century rulers toward French ideals and culture. Using historical sources (Essays, Bibliography, etc.), we first investigate whether, in the period 1701-1790, the local rulers (i) had a direct French relative (mother, father, spouse) and so an explicit link with the French aristocracy; (ii) displayed a positive disposition toward customs and tradition of the French court (e.g. the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, Ernest Louis, was so fascinated with the grandeur of the Louis XIV court that he dissipated the finance of his state in the effort of emulating it); (iii) embraced the French Enlightenment ideals (e.g. the Elector of Palatinate Charles Theodore had an assiduous correspondence with Voltaire); (iv) had a long standing relation with the French Royal House (e.g. William Henry, Prince of Nassau-Saarbrucken, often traveled to Paris where he even received military honors). The Pro-French ruler dummy equals 1 if at least one of the conditions stated above is satisfied. Albeit rather subjective, this variable nicely summarizes the rulers' disposition towards the foreign culture. We expect those rulers with a more favorable attitude towards France to better accept and enforce the transplanted institutions.
Our results might be induced by institutional rather than cultural proximity. In fact, during the eighteenth-century, some rulers, maybe inspired by the Enlightenment principles, enacted reforms in their states promoting literacy, simplifying jus- tice and administration. 22 It is possible that these early reforms were implemented in places culturally closer to France, making it easier to enforce the institutions brought by Napoleon. In order to control for this potential confounding factor, we construct a measure of historical institutional proximity. In particular, we collect data on progressive reforms in the educational, judicial or administrative system implemented in each state between 1701 and 1790. We classify as Reformists those rulers who implemented at least one modernizing reform and we create an index based on the fraction of years the progressive king was in power. For example, Frederick the Great implemented innovative educational reforms and he held power in Brandenburg for 46 years, hence he contributes to the Brandenburg institutional-proximity index by 0.51 (i.e. 46 over 90 years). Given that this index captures similarity between the Napoleonic institutions and the pre-existing ones, we conjecture that institutional-proximity positively affects the success of the transplant. Finally, in our analysis, we use a rich set of controls including historical, geographic and contemporaneous controls. Historical controls are meant to capture pre-existing differences across counties. We construct a dummy variable for the presence of Hanseatic or free imperial cities in sixteenth-century, since they benefited from particular economic and diplomatic privileges. We also control for pre-Napoleonic economic development using urban population in 1500 taken from Becker and Woessmann (2009). 23 Geographic controls include the latitude (in radiants), total area of the county (log) and a dummy variable for polish-speaking provinces (mainly located in the East and mainly underdeveloped). 24 Using information from the 1871 and 1886 Censuses, we control Table ? ? compares the unconditional means of our main dependent variable across different religious affiliation between counties that received or not French institutions. In particular, the institutional transplant is associated with higher wages, but the effect is much stronger in Catholic territories, and the diff-in-diff coefficient is statistically significant. This first simple result points to the presence of heterogeneity in the economic effect of an institutional transplant and provides interesting motivating evidence for our empirical investigation. specification in Table ? ?. In particular, the average number of counties in each kingdom is 9.3 and the average East-West distance we exploit is 160 km, about 10% of the total extension of eighteenth-century Prussia. 25 In particular, Socio-Economic Controls include total population size (log), percentage of county population in urban areas 1871, percentage of Jews, percentage of labor force in mining 1882, number of farms 1882, (log)distance from imperial capital (Berlin), distance from the district capital and year of annexation to Prussia. Education Controls are the percentage of pupils with distance to school over 3 km, total number of pupils 1886 (log), total number of teachers 1886 (log) and number of free apartments for male teachers 1886. 26 Summary statistics by counties that received French institutions are reported in Table A .1 in the Appendix. 
Institutional Transplant and Religious Beliefs
Identification strategy
This section presents the empirical model we shall use to test our central hypothesis, namely, whether the institutional transfer was more effective -and hence induced better economic performance -in counties "culturally more similar" to the French Empire.
Our baseline model is as follows:
where y i is the average income of male elementary school teachers in county i; Culture i is measured by religious affiliation (i.e. Protestant share of the population measured at county level), Napoleon i is a binary variable for the adoption of the Napoleonic code. H i , G i , E i and X i are, respectively, vectors of historical, geographical, educational and economic controls; ε i is a standard error term. We also include the interaction of Napoleon i with pre-Napoleonic and geographic variables to control for potential nonlinear confounding factors.
The key coefficient, β 3 , is the interaction between the transplanted French institution and the measure of local culture. We expect β 3 to be significantly different from zero and, in particular, that cultural similarity and institutions positively interact. Hence our prior is β 3 < 0 when Protestant share is used (i.e. Napoleonic institutions had a weaker impact in Protestant areas). 27 Our identification strategy relies on two main assumptions. First, the areas invaded by Napoleon were not chosen because of their prosperity. As discussed in Section ?? and extensively argued by Acemoglu et al. (2011) , Napoleonic invasions were primarily driven by geo-political, military and ideological concerns, hence French occupation can be considered exogenous. Second, religious affiliation is persistent across centuries and thus the share of Protestants in 1871 captures cultural traits that already existed before the arrival of Napoleon. 28 Indeed, previous empirical evidence finds extreme persistence in religious distribution over time. 29 Figure ? ? shows the religious affiliation after the peace of Augsburg. Kingdoms in central Germany adopted Lutheranism while areas in the West (Rhineland) and in the East (Poland) remained essentially Catholic. A brief comparison with the share of Protestants in nineteenthcentury (Figure ?? ) confirms that the distribution in 1870 closely resembles the one at the end of the sixteenth-century. 27 Recall that we consider Protestant Share to be an inverse proxy of cultural similarity. 28 In a robustness check we relax this assumption using historical affiliation data. The historical measure of Protestant majority is a dummy variable defined at a higher level of aggregation (kingdom instead of county level). 29 ? finds high correlation in religious affiliation in Germany across centuries. Spenkuch (2010) provides detailed data and figures of Protestant and Catholic distributions in Germany after the Peace of Augsburg. 
Results
In this section we test our main specification and report the results in Table ? ?. Notably, the coefficient of interest (Napoleon × Protestant Share) capturing the interplay between the transplanted institutions and religious affiliation, is always negative, significant and remarkably stable across the different specifications. 30 Column (1) shows the results of the most parsimonious specification, which includes only geographical controls and provides evidence that Napoleonic institution had virtually no impact on economic performance in Protestant areas. Specifically, the positive effect of institutions vanishes for a county with a Protestant share of population equal to 70.5% (the median Protestant share in the whole sample is 83% while in the invaded areas is 60%). In columns (2)-(5) we progressively add different sets of controls. Column (2) includes historical variables to take into account counties' pre-napoleonic differences. Columns (3)-(4) add economic and education controls. These variables not only capture the economic and social outlook of the county after the Congress of Vienna, but are meant to factor in those elements that influence 30 Our result on the coefficient of the interaction term is very stable also when we replicate Table 3 teachers' demand and/or supply, thereby directly affecting our preferred proxy of economic performance. In order to rule out the possibility that our coefficient of interest is spuriously driven by the interplay between the transplanted institutions and other pre-existing county-level characteristics, column (5) implements our baseline model and it includes the interactions of Napoleonic institutions with both historical and geographic controls. Finally, column (6) adds to the baseline specification prenapoleonic reign fixed effects. This allows us to take into account all pre-napoleonic reign-level characteristics (e.g. institutional setting, infrastructures, etc) and exploit only the within reign variation of the explanatory variables. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term does not change (it slightly decreases) and does not lose statistical significance.
Furthermore, consistently with the existing literature, the linear effect of both good institutions (Napoleon) and Protestant affiliation (Protestant Share) on our measure of economic performance is positive and statistically significant across all the specifications, suggesting that the transplant of good institutions and the presence of a Protestant majority can indeed improve economic outcomes. 31
Robustness Checks
This section presents a battery of alternative specifications in order to investigate the robustness of the estimates of the baseline model (equation 1). Results are reported in Table ? ?.
Alternative Outcomes Variables Panel a) shows that the baseline results hold for alternative proxies of economic prosperity. In row (1) we use the only other direct measure of income available, that is wage of daily laborer in 1892. 32 Then, as in Becker and Woessmann (2009), we use as a dependent variable income tax revenue per capita (row 2) and the size of the non agricultural sector (row 3). The coefficient of the interaction term remains consistently negative and statistically significant even when adopting difference proxy of economic development.
Alternative Institutional Variables
In panel b), we show that the results hold when using different proxies for French institution. Specifically, we reduce our treatment group depending on the exposure to Napoleonic code. We start by using a more conservative definition of institutional variable, namely we define as invaded only those territories formally annexed to the French Empire (row 4). In this subsample the effect of the treatment might be reinforced since, not only the code was imposed, but also the administrative structure and local governors were replaced with French ones. We then exclude the territories under the direct control of the French Empire and we con-31 Note that in column 5 the coefficient associated with French institutions is not significant anymore since in that specification we are including all the interaction between Historical and Geographical controls and the Napoleon dummy. Hence, we cannot interpret that coefficient as the linear effect of good institutions. Similarly, in column 6, the coefficient is not statistically significant because we are exploiting within-kingdoms variation, and the identification relies only on 3 kingdoms that were only partially invaded.
32 Table ? ? displays the results for the male laborers in urban areas. The coefficients are virtually the same when using wage of rural male daily laborer or wage of female daily laborer. Results are available upon request. sider only those territories in the Confederation of the Rhine (i.e. Satellite States) which adopted the code (row 5). Finally, we use years of French domination as a proxy for intensity-to-treatment (row 6). Even if years of French domination is marginally not significant, all measures yield the same message as the preferred Napoleonic-invasion dummy.
Alternative Protestant Variables
In panel c) we show that the results are robust to using alternative measures of religious affiliation. First, we use a dummy that equals one if the county had an absolute Protestant majority in 1870 (share of Protestant >50%) (row 7). Crucial for our identification is the persistence of the religious affiliation and using a binary variable attenuates the concern that Protestant share may have changed over time. We then construct a historical measure of the Protestant majority in seventeenth-century using data from Cantoni (2012). The advantage of this measure is that it is defined two centuries before the arrival of Napoleon. It has however two limitations: the historical religious affiliation is defined at reign kingdom -not county level -in 1600 and it is not available for the entire sample (row 8). Finally, in order to address endogeneity concerns, we follow the literature instrumenting Protestant share with the distance from Wittenberg. We identify the exogenous variation in Protestantism using the concentric diffusion of Protestantism in Prussia around Luther's city (row 9). Note that the coefficients maintain the same sign as in the baseline specification, and remain significant at conventional levels.
Additional Controls In panel d), we show that our evidence is preserved when adding supplementary controls addressing potential issues. A possible concern could be that our result is induced by differences in purchasing power across regions or by other drivers that influence the demand for teachers, and consequently their wages. Hence, we first include a price measure to capture potential differences in purchasing power across the different counties. This proxy is constructed as the ratio between total expenditures in new school buildings in 1886 over the total number of new school buildings. This measure should capture variation in housing prices, a relevant component of CPI. 33 Albeit not perfect, this is the only available measure of historical unit values at county level (row 10). We then add a group of demographic variables in 1871 -including household size, share of population born in the county, share of population of Prussian origin, share of females and share of the population under 16 -that might influence the demand of teachers (row 11). We also include literacy rate in an additional specification (row 12). The results always confirm the baseline estimates.
Since frequently the same prince ruled over non-contiguous territories, the absence of the sovereign in the kingdom might have caused weaker legitimacy of the ruler thus affecting the reception of French institutions. Hence we create a dummy variable which identifies peripheral territories with respect to the ruler main residence. Results are robust to the inclusion of this dummy and its interaction with Napoleon (row 13).
Finally, we want our results not to be distorted by sentiment toward France induced by previous military invasions. Bonaparte might have been seen as the legitimate heir of Louis XIV, the "hereditary enemy", provoking hostility and francophobia. Alternatively, previous invasions might have determined a higher exposure to French culture and hence been a catalyst for the reception of the new institution. We thus construct a dummy variable that equals one if the reign had been occupied by French troops after the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Our main result is not affected by the introduction of the control and its interaction with the institutional proxy (row 14).
Clustered Standard Errors
Panel e) clusters standard errors at the pre-Napoleon reign (row 15) and 1871 Prussian political district level (row 16) to allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix capturing potential serial correlation in the residual error term. The coefficients of interest are always statistically significant as in the baseline estimates.
Alternative Fixed Effects
In Panel f) we use alternative pre-Napoleonic fixed effects, Ruler FE. We identify 18 different rulers at the time of the Napoleonic invasions, since, as noted above, several kingdoms were under the same ruler, and include a dummy for each of them. Our results are robust to the inclusion of this control (row 17).
Outliers Finally, In panel f), we show that our evidence is not driven by influential observations. First, we trim (row 18) and winsorize (row 19) the extreme 1% of observations of our dependent variable. In row 20, we compute a measure of influence of each observation on the estimated coefficient. In particular, an observation is considered influential when the difference between the regression coefficient estimated using the whole sample and the one calculated excluding the observation is above a standard cut-off value. 34 We then exclude all the influential observations for the coefficient of our interest (Protestant × Napoleonic Code). Results are virtually the same.
Diff-in-Diff Specification
Our main specification allows us to exploit a rich variation across counties, however, there might still be the concern that historical controls and kingdom fixed effects do not fully account for pre-Napoleonic trends. We then test our hypothesis using a different dataset that allows us to implement a Diff-in-Diff specification. We exploit the data compiled by Acemoglu et al. (2011) . The dataset has information on urbanization levels and religious affiliation for a panel of 19 independent German states (or provinces of larger states) for the years 1750, 1800, 1850, 1875 and 1900. Unfortunately these data have a higher level of aggregation (19 states vs more than 440 counties) and are not suitable for a deeper investigation of the potential channels that may drive our results. In this case our baseline specification reads:
where urb rate it is the urbanization rate of state i in year t, Post is a dummy variable that equals one if we consider a time period after the Napoleonic invasion (i.e. second half of nineteenth-century), Napoleon is a time-invariant dummy variable that captures French presence in the state and Prot is the share of Protestants around 1800 (constant over time). Results are reported in Table ? ?. Column 1 shows the Diff-in-Diff estimation. Note that the result is remarkably similar to the one documented in Table ? ?.
There is a negative interaction between French institutions and Protestant share after the institutional transplant, moreover, the positive effect of good institutions vanishes for a share of Protestant around 85% (the median Protestant share in this sample is 80%). This finding remains robust when implementing a regression weighted by total population in 1750 as in ? (column (2)). Column (3) conveys the same message using a different measure of French institutions, i.e. the number of years of French presence, while column (4) shows consistent results using year dummies interacted with the institutional variable. Even when exploiting a different dataset, our findings suggest that the transplant had a strong positive impact on economic outcomes only in "culturally similar" areas (i.e. where the percentage of Catholic was high). Specifically, the negative interaction between culture and the civil code has been significantly affecting the urbanization rate since 1875, i.e. 60 years after the Congress of Vienna. 35 34 The cut-off value we use for highly influential observation is : 2/sqrt(n). Even though, our results are robust to different cut-off values. 35 Compared to ? we find the positive effect of institutions on economic performance 25 years earlier. 
Possible Alternative Explanations
This section investigates alternative channels proposed in the literature that might explain our findings. We investigate three possible mechanisms: human capital accumulation, religious fractionalization and religious distance from the neighbors. Human capital accumulation is a significant driver of economic growth but it is also closely related to the diffusion of Protestantism, as already stressed in the existing literature. 36 A potential concern is that some of the institutions brought by Napoleon had a negative impact on the human capital accumulation of the counties. Narrative evidence suggests that Napoleon's educational policies were not aimed to boost literacy but they were targeting higher education in order to breed well-prepared military and administrative elites. Consequently, technical schools were promoted (Polytechnic, Conservatory of art and trades, etc.) and lycees introduced. Napoleon, in fact, paid very little attention to primary education -and even less to the education of girls -which was mainly managed at the local level and left to religious institutions. 37 These policies could have led to a relevant role of Catholic parishes in the invaded areas weakening Protestant human capital accumulation. In order to test the validity of this potential channel, we use pre-Napoleonic measures of education: the presence of schools and monasteries in 1517 -the most prominent educational centers at the timeand the existence of universities in the county before Napoleonic invasion. We also include the interaction between these two historical variables with the imposition of the Napoleonic Code.
Results are reported in Table ? ?. In column (1) we show that including these controls does not affect either the sign or the significance of the coefficient of interest. Note that, since the dummy Napoleon is interacted with several controls, the coefficient of this variable does not capture the marginal effect of the institutional transplant. Indeed, the overall impact is positive and marginally significant. 38 We can conclude that Napoleonic institutions do not negatively interact with historical proxies of human capital abundance and that the human capital channel does not explain our main result. Most of the counties invaded by French troops were mainly Catholic. An alternative explanation of the negative interaction between Protestantism and institutions may be that those counties with a higher share of Protestants were also highly fractionalized. A potential concern is that the interaction term reflects the effects of religious fragmentation. Several papers have investigated the cost and the benefits of diversity, whether racial, ethnic, religious, or linguistic. 39 Fragmented societies are often more prone to poor policy management and pose more politico-economic challenges than homogeneous ones. A diverse cultural or ethnic mix however may also bring a variety of abilities and experiences that might boost productivity by means of 36 For the effect of human capital on economic growth see, for example, ? and ?. For the link between Protestantism and human capital accumulation see ?.
37 See ?, pag.50. 38 When we evaluate the effect at the average value of the continuous variables when all the dummies equal zero the effect is 0.04, significant at 10%. When we evaluate it at the average value of the continuous variables when all the dummies equal one, instead, the overall effect is not statistically different from zero. 39 For example ? We construct a Herfindal Index using the shares of three biggest religious groups (Protestants, Catholics and Jews) and we use this measure and its interaction with the Napoleonic dummy to test this alternative explanation. Column (2) shows that religious fractionalization negatively interacts with the institutional transplant but this channel does not affect the interaction between Protestant share -as a proxy of cultural distance -and institutions.
Another concern may be that counties that display internal religious homogeneity might be very diverse from their neighboring counties and thus economically and politically disadvantaged. This issue could be particularly relevant in our analysis given that Protestant counties in the Western part of the sample are few and surrounded by a majority of Catholic ones. We create a measure of religious distance with neighboring counties as the difference between Protestant share of the county and the average Protestant share of the neighboring counties. Column (3) confirms that the negative interaction term is not determined by religious distance from the Catholic neighborhood. Finally, in column (4) we implement a horse-race, including together all the alternative explanations. We find that our main results survive. This supports our hypothesis that it is cultural incompatibility driving the negative coefficient between Protestant share and institution and that culture plays a relevant role in law transplants.
The relevance of Cultural Commonality
Summing up: our results are robust to possible different definitions of the variables and alternative specifications. We devote this section to investigate whether there are other cultural aspects, not embedded in religious affiliation, that facilitate the reception of Napoleonic institutions. To this purpose, we construct alternative measures of cultural commonality (see Section 3) which we then add to religious affiliation in our main specification. Moreover, we analyze the role of pre-existing institutions as a determinant of a successful transplant and show that, once "institutional proximity" has been controlled for, "cultural proximity" still matters. Table ? ? collects the results. 40 Columns (1)-(3) augment the specifications reported in column (5) of Table ? ? with the new cultural and institutional measures, while columns (4)-(6) implement different horse-races which include the measure of institutional proximity coupled with Protestant Share and the proxies of cultural commonality. 41 If enforcement of Napoleonic institutions is favored by familiarity with Frenchness, populations that were previously exposed to French culture should be better recipient of the new institutions. We consider relevant two levels of this exposure: the one of local population, and the one of the ruling class. We proxy the former with French 40 Results are virtually the same even when we do not control for the interaction between Protestant Share and French Institutions. Now, the interaction between French Exposure and French Institutions is still positive but not significant. See Table A .4 in Appendix. 41 Note that we cannot implement the specification with the kingdom fixed effects since our proxies of cultural commonality are defined at kingdom-level.
Exposure -which captures protracted Huguenots' presence and the diffusion of books in French -and the latter with Pro-French Ruler -which combines rulers' attitudes toward Enlightenment and his connections with French aristocracy. These two variables are essentially orthogonal (their correlation is 0.052). The coefficients on the interactions between Napoleon and cultural proxies, in columns (1)-(2), show that each of the cultural dimensions we consider is meaningful and distinct from religious affiliation. Indeed, the transplanted institutions had better economic impact in those areas that had already experienced contacts with French culture. The effect that we attribute to cultural similarity could in fact derive from institutional features. Inspired by the spirit of Enlightenment, Pro-French rulers may have enacted progressive reforms during the eighteenth-century making local population already accustomed to a modern legal framework, and hence more prone to accept Napoleonic institutions. Therefore, we want to disentangle the contribution of institutional proximity from the one of cultural commonality in mediating the economic effect of the transplant. For this reason, we construct an index of institutional proximity based on the judicial, administrative and educational progressive reforms implemented in the eighteenth-century (see Section 3). Results in column (3) suggest that pre-existing liberal institutions facilitate the enforcement of the Napoleonic Code, confirming the relevance of institutional proximity in an institutional transplant. Nonetheless, cultural commonality -as proxied by Protestant Share -still plays a significant role. In the last three columns, we include French Exposure, Pro-French Ruler respectively, along with Institutional Proximity. The results in columns (4)-(5) provide evidence that the cultural-exposure channel survives when controlling for institutional similarity, supporting the importance of cultural dimensions other than the ones summarized by religious affiliation. When all our proxies of cultural similarity are included, in column (6), the main message still stands. The signs of the coefficients of interest are consistent with the ones in previous specifications, however, beside the interaction between religious affiliation and French institutions, only the one between Napoleon and Pro-French Ruler remains significant. This could indicate that, not only do rulers' attitudes play a decisive role in the reception of the new institutions, but that their role is also preponderant compared to the one played by population exposure to French culture.
Conclusion
This paper is the first attempt to gauge the effect of the interaction between institutions and culture on a country's economic performance. Specifically, we ask if "cultural similarity" may facilitate the assimilation of good foreign institutions thus enhancing their positive effect on economic outcomes. Nineteenth-century Prussia provides a very suitable context to test this hypothesis as it allows us to exploit a quasi-natural experiment, the Napoleonic military campaign, in an environment characterized by a rich variety of cultural traits. All our evidence points to the importance of culture as a determinant of a successful transplant. Indeed, the effect of radical institutional reforms brought by Napoleon in territories which either shared religious beliefs or had experienced previous contact with French culture is positive and significant. We find no effect in "culturally distant" areas. Our results survive even when controlling for institutional proximity between pre-existing and transplanted institutions.
Although we analyze a very specific historical environment and extrapolation to other contexts might be hazardous, our findings call for extreme care when deciding to export seemingly good institutions, for the transplant may fail when it conflicts with local culture and pre-existing institutions. Notes: Geographic Controls: latitude, area of the county (log) and polish speaking area. Historical Controls: population in 1500 and Hanseatic or Imperial cities. Socio-Economic Controls: total population size (log), percentage of county population in urban areas 1871, percentage of Jews, percentage of labor force in mining 1882, number of farms 1882 (log), distance from imperial capital (Berlin), distance from the district capital and year of annexation to Prussia. Education Controls: percentage of pupils with distance to school over 3 km, total number of pupils 1886 (log), total number of teachers 1886 (log) and number of free apartments for male teachers 1886. Hist & Geo Interactions: interaction between Napoleon and both Geographic Controls and Historical Controls. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: Geographic Controls: latitude, area of the county (log) and polish speaking area. Historical Controls: population in 1500 and Hanseatic or Imperial cities. Socio-Economic Controls: total population size (log), percentage of county population in urban areas 1871, percentage of Jews, percentage of labor force in mining 1882, number of farms 1882 (log), distance from imperial capital (Berlin), distance from the district capital and year of annexation to Prussia. Education Controls: percentage of pupils with distance to school over 3 km, total number of pupils 1886 (log), total number of teachers 1886 (log) and number of free apartments for male teachers 1886. Hist & Geo Interactions: interaction between Napoleon and both Geographic Controls and Historical Controls. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: Standard errors, clustered at the pre-Napoleon kingdom-level, in parenthesis. See also notes to previous tables. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
